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BOOK REVIEW
REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT.

By

Susan Ehrlich. New York, NY: Routledge. 2001. Pp. 174. $25.95.
Reviewed by Kimberly Wolf*

I. INTRODUCTION

Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior
of errant young girls and the women coming before the
courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes
are multifarious and distorted ....

One form taken by

these complexes is that of contriving false charges of
sexual offences by men. The unchaste mind finds
incidental but direct expression in the narration of
imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the
heroine or victim ....

The real victim, however, too

often in such cases is the innocent man.'
In her most recent linguistic study, Representing Rape:
language and sexual consent, Susan Ehrlich 2 endeavors to expose the
hegemonic notions of sexual assault victims that permeate our legal
system.3 The author quotes evidence authority John Wigmore, above,
as representative of attempts to justify "special rules of evidence" that
place far more emphasis on the complainant's behavior than is
permitted in other criminal trials.4 Ehrlich reveals the existence of
cultural myths surrounding rape trials, exemplified by Wigmore's
"special rules of evidence," that are embedded in our sexual assault
*
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(Routledge 2001) (citing JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736 (Little
Brown and Company 1970)).
2. Susan Ehrlich is a professor in the Department of Languages, Literatures and
Linguistics at York University, Toronto, Canada.
3. See id. at 4. Ehrlich cites Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity as follows:
A dominant cultural ideal of masculinity that does not necessarily correspond closely to the
personalities of actual males. The public face of hegemonic masculinity is what sustains
powerful men and what large numbers of men are motivated to support. Id. at 156, n. 17
(citing R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND

SEXUAL POLITICS 185 (Stanford University Press 1987)).
4. Id. at 66.
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adjudication process. 5 These myths, Ehrlich argues, ultimately
constrain the complainants' ability to present their version of events
and points of view.6
The book opens with a discussion of the ways in which
stereotypes serve to shape and constrain women's ability to tell the
story of their sexual assault experience. 7 Ehrlich then considers the
accused's ability to recast themselves as a non-actor, and the effects
that such a characterization may have on the outcome of the trial.8 The
third chapter focuses on the role attorneys and judges play in enforcing
the stereotypical conceptions of sexual assault perpetrators and victims
through evidentiary rulings and themes in questioning. 9 Next, Ehrlich
criticizes the emphasis placed on the victims' actions, or lack thereof,
in attempting to stop the unwanted touching.' 0 In the closing chapter,
the author addresses her misgivings about the "miscommunication
model"11 of rape, which is gaining some acceptance in the linguistic
arena.
Ehrlich's study focuses on two acquaintance rape trials-the
first is a York University disciplinary tribunal hearing and the second
is a criminal trial. 12 Two women made allegations of sexual assault
against the same defendant, Matt.' 3 The first complainant, Connie,
alleged that after having dinner with Matt, she invited him back to her
dorm room, where they engaged in consensual kissing and back
massaging. 14 According to Connie, she began to protest as Matt
continued in his sexual advances. 15 She further alleged that Matt
forced her to perform fellatio on him until orgasm.
The second
complainant, Marg, met Matt at a nightclub, where she and her friend,
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id.at4, 152.
7. Id. at 1-35.
8. Id. at 36-61.
9. Id. at 62-93.
10. Id. at 94-120.
11. Id.at 121-152.
12. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 31. The disciplinary tribunal consists of three tribunal
members, in this case two faculty members and a graduate student. The witnesses are
examined by the prosecution, defense and by the tribunal members. The standard of proof
used was a "balance of probabilities," or to decide which of the parties was to be believed
more. The criminal trial was a bench trial, in which the Crown (the Canadian government)
had to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the complainants had not consented to the
sexual acts. Id. at 33-35.
13.

Id. at 31-32.

14. Id. at 32.
15. Id.
16. Id. The facts were not at issue in either the criminal trial or the university tribunal.
The issue was whether these acts were consensual.
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Melinda, were socializing. 17 After Marg realized her car had been
towed, she asked Matt and Melinda's boyfriend, Bob, for help.' 8 The
four students reached Marg and Melinda's dorm room at
approximately 4:00 a.m., and given the late hour, Matt and Bob spent
the night. 19 Marg agreed that Matt could sleep in her bed, but warned
him that she would not tolerate any sexual advances.2 0 Despite her
objections,21 Marg alleged that Matt persisted in his unwanted sexual
behavior.
The university tribunal described Matt's behavior as "below
the standard of conduct [they] expect from all members of the
,,22
University community.
Despite the university lawyer's
recommendation that Matt be expelled from the school, the tribunal
penalized him solely by restricting his access to the residences on
campus where the events had taken place. 23 They stated that nothing
indicated that Matt posed a "clear and present threat" to others.24 The
criminal court judge convicted Matt of one count of sexual assault, for
the incident with Marg.25 The judge acquitted him of events linked
with Connie. 26 From the criminal judge's perspective, the major factor
distinguishing the two incidents was that some consensual activity
took place between Connie and Matt, whereas Marg did not grant
permission for any intimate acts. 27 The judge issued the following
warning in his opinion:
Young men must be sensitive to a woman's right to say
no, and young women, in turn, must realize that when a
young man becomes aroused during sexual activity
beyond a moderate degree there is a danger that he will
28
be driven by hormones rather than by conscience.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19.

Id. at 33.

20. Id.
21.

Id.

22. Id. at 54.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 56.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 57. A second distinguishing point is that Marg had two witnesses in her room
that night, Melinda and Bob, both of whom testified on her behalf.
28. Id. at 57.
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Such a statement epitomizes the potential for cultural myths
about sexuality to influence sexual assault adjudication. The judge
becomes implicit in Matt's grammar of non-agency, casting the
defendant's behavior as dependent on his sexual impulses.3 ° Further,
both the university and criminal decisions reveal the true status of
sexual assault laws: although the law ostensibly constrains male
violence 3 against
females, in reality it allows such violence to
1
continue.

II. SUMMARY
32

A. The institutionalcoerciveness of legal discourse

Ehrlich begins her discussion of the nature of gender identity
and its social construction by discussing conceptual changes that have
occurred since the early 1990s, when feminist debates about the
33
correlation between linguistic practices and social identities began.
The author argues that "conceptions of gender as categorical, fixed and
static have increasingly been abandoned in favour of more
constructivist and dynamic ones."34 She cites the sociolinguistic
argument that linguistic behavior determines aspects of social
identity 35 as typical of the earlier school of thought that focused
specifically on "the correlation of linguistic variables with the
independent variable of sex. ' , 36 To represent the more modem
approach to the relationship between language and gender, coined
'critical theory,' Ehrlich includes the claims of Deborah Cameron, a
scholar noted for her new developments in feminist thought about
language.37 Cameron contends that linguistic practices form social
identities-that is, language is one of the components that constitute
the speaker's identity as a particular type of subject. 38 At first glance,
29. See infra text accompanying notes 54-62.
30. Id.
31. Id. at60.
32. Throughout her book, Ehrlich only uses capital letters for the first letter of each
chapter title. All other words in the title are in lowercase letters.
33. See id. at 5.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5 (citing C. West and D. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & Soc'Y 2551 (1987)).
36. Id.
37.

Id. at 5 (citing DEBORAH CAMERON, VERBAL HYGIENE 15-16 (Routledge 1995)).

38. Id.
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this distinction does not appear to have the capacity to affect one's
everyday life, since the idea that one's linguistic practices forms one's
social identity or vice versa seems to have minimal consequences. On
the contrary, by viewing language as performative, Ehrlich forms the
backbone of her assertions. Ehrlich contends that "linguistic practices
...continually bring into being individuals' social identities. Under
this account . ' . gender is something individuals do-in part through
linguistic choices-as opposed to something individuals are or
have." 39 The ability of women to vary their 'performances of gender'
depending on context challenges stereotypical descriptions of male and
female speech styles as an unchanging result of their social identities.4 °
Supporting her argument that women can vary their linguistic
performances, Ehrlich cites a 1996 study by Freed and Greenwood,
which found that "language and gender studies conducted in natural
settings may often find differences. ..in women's and men's speech
simply because women and men are frequently engaged in different
activities and not because of any differences in women and men
themselves.'
Freed and Greenwood concluded that, because the
activities in which people are participating produce certain speech
patterns, "communicative styles are customs related to actions,
activities and behaviors. . .,4 This analysis introduces the possibility
that individuals can resist hegemonic notions of masculinity and
femininity through linguistic practices, a concept Ehrlich more fully
develops throughout this work.43
In declaring that women have the ability to. alter their
performances of gender, Ehrlich accounts for the difficulties in such a
process. The author identifies "institutionally coercive environments
(those in which "dominant gender ideologies often mold and/or inhibit
the kinds of gendered identities that women and men produce") 44 as
the main obstruction preventing women from taking advantage of this
opportunity. 45 Applying the theory of institutional coerciveness to the
39. Id.(citing C. West and D. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SoC'Y 25-51
(1987)).

40. See id. at 5-6. Ehrlich challenges the language and gender research of the 1970s and
1980s that "took the 'difference' between men an women's linguistic behavior as axiomatic
and as the starting point for empirical investigations," particularly the studies that claimed that
the female speech style is cooperative, while the male speech style is competitive. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 7 (citing A. Freed & A. Greenwood, Women, Men and Type of Talk: What
Makes the Difference?, 25 LANGUAGE IN SOC'Y 1, 67 (1996)).

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
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legal sphere, the author argues the following: "Not only are dominant
notions about male and female sexuality and violence against women
implicated in legal statutes and judicial decisions surrounding sexual
46
assault .. .they also penetrate the discursive arena of the trial."
Casting sexual assault adjudication as a vehicle that shapes and
constrains performances of gender, Ehrlich begins her demonstration
of the ways in which courtroom language transmits androcentric
values, privileging the male's sexual prerogatives at the expense of the
woman's sexual autonomy.47 Furthermore, she declares that these
representations "shape and structure the witnesses' own accounts of
,48
the events . ...To Ehrlich, the law not only has the power to enact rules and
impose punishments, but also "has the capacity to impose and affirm
culturally powerful definitions of social reality. '49 Laws that do not
extend to gay and lesbian couples, for example, both communicate
social convictions about normal and acceptable lifestyle choices and
enforce the convictions through directpunishment or by withholding a
right granted to heterosexual couples. 5° With regard to sexual assaults,
the criminal justice system defines the characteristics of a legitimate
victim and a legitimate perpetrator as follows:
'Legitimate' perpetrators . . . are strangers to their
victims, carry a weapon, and inflict physical injury
upon their victim, beyond the sexual violence;
'legitimate' victims are women raped by precisely these
kinds of perpetrators. The discourses of rape . . .
construct stranger rape as 'real rape' and render the vast
majority of rapes invisible.51
Many theorists speculate that this assumption results in an inaccurate
count of not only the rapes prosecuted, but also the rapes reported each
year. 52 MacKinnon argues that women only report rapes that they

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See id. at 10-11.
Id.at 11.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at20.
Id. at 21 (citing CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81 (Harvard

University Press 1987)).
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consider to be believable.53 Thus, the criminal justice system protects
male sexual interests through culturally-powerful
legal discourse
54
which controls the female victims themselves.
Judicial decisions are yet another source of 'institutional
coercion,' Ehrlich argues, especially where the legislature fails to
adequately define what constitutes the sexual offense. Even in
evidentiary rulings, however, judicial decisions are influenced by
traditional cultural mythology surrounding rapes. 55 Ehrlich cites the
infamous William Kennedy Smith, Jr. rape trial56 to exemplify the way
in which defense attorneys can maneuver around the rape-shield laws
57
to introduce negative evidence about the victim's past sexual history.
The judge permitted each juror to examine the complainant's dress,
bra, and panties on the premise that they were examining the clothing
for tears or stains. 58 In reality, the defense attorney was using the
suggestive articles of clothing to paint a picture of the complainant as a
sexually provocative, fortune-seeking woman-in spite of the severe
restrictions on admitting such evidence and testimony in a sexual
assault trial. 59 The prosecuting attorney, however, was not permitted
to introduce the testimony of three other women who alleged that the
defendant sexually assaulted them within the past ten years, an
evidentiary ruling that many commentators believe to have "won the
case for the defense". 60 Because judicial decisions often reproduce the
cultural misunderstandings that progressive feminist legislation
attempts to defeat, Ehrlich argues that scholars and feminists should
critique not the law, but rather, the "actual practices whereby legal
concepts (e.g., 'consent'
and 'sexual assault') give rise to ...meanings
61
interpretations."
and

53.

Id.

(citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81 (Harvard

University Press 1987)). MacKinnon defines "believable rapes" as those committed by a
stranger and/or by a black male. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Id. (citing Florida v. Smith, Fla. West Palm Beach County Ct. (1991)).
57. Id. at 26.
58.

Id.

59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. (citing PEGGY R. SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL
219 (Doubleday 1996)).
61. Id. at 28. In discussing these judicially-enforced cultural misunderstandings, Ehrlich
argues that these rape myths also reflect social discourses about normative sexuality. That is,
women are supposed to be the passive recipients of male sexual desire, and protests from the
female are an expected part of normal heterosexual sex. Sexual encounters in which the
female does not give consent, or even overtly resists, are considered acceptable. Id. at 29.
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B. The accused's grammarof non-agency

Ehrlich explains that she approached Matt's sexual assault trial
transcripts using "critical discourse analysis," an approach that
"expos[es] the linguistic mechanisms of hegemony in order to
facilitate the access to a language of empowerment by marginalized
groups. 62 By exposing the "ideological loading" of linguistic
practices, people become aware of other ways in which to think about
the world.63 The author argues that language, and the particular
perspective it entails, mediates our experience of reality. She points to
Cameron's analysis of the androcentric nature of terms such as
penetration, fuck, screw, and lay, which portray consensual sex as
something that men do to women. 64 Language has a considerable
impact on the way listeners interpret and visualize events-a fact that
becomes extremely important in a sexual assault trial, where65 oral
testimony is often the only evidence available to persuade jurors.
Sexual assault defendants typically employ linguistic tactics
that work to portray themselves as innocent of acts of unlawful sexual
66
aggression, a strategy Ehrlich labels the "grammar of non-agency."
The author points to a psycholinguistic study of the role that active and
passive voice can play in the listener's interpretation of the event being
described.67 The LaFrance and Hahn study found that subjects tended
to attribute greater causality to patients, as opposed to agents, when
interpreting sentences represented in the passive voice. 68 Therefore,
when listening to passive-voice defendant testimony in a sexual assault
trial, jurors assign less responsibility to the perpetrator and more
responsibility to the victim.6 9 Utilizing direct quotes from the criminal
and university trials, Ehrlich provides numerous specific examples of
Matt's attempts to use non-agency to mitigate, diffuse, obscure or
eliminate his role in the event. An example of each technique follows:

62. Id. at 35.
63. Id. (citing Norman Fairclough & Ruth Wodak, Critical Discourse Analysis, in
DISCOURSE AS SOCIAL INTERACTION 258, 258 (T. A. van Dijk ed., 1997)).

64.

DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY

65.

EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 36.

(St. Martin's Press 1992).

66. Id. at 38. Ehrlich defines an agent as a "willful initiator of an event that is depicted
as having consequences for either an object or an animate patient." Id.
67. Id. at 40 (citing M. LaFrance and G. Hahn, The DisappearingAgent: Gender
Stereotypes, Interpersonal Verbs and Implicit Causality, in THE WOMEN AND LANGUAGE
DEBATE: A SOURCEBOOK 348 (Camille A. Roman et al. eds. 1994)).

68. Id.
69. Id.
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Mitigation: Matt changes the word "entwine" to the
more affectionate, consensual term "caress".
University Prosecutor: Okay she says that during this
oral sex you have your hand entwined in her hair? Do
you recall that?
Matt: Yeah I was caressing her hair.7 °
Diffusion: Matt transforms assertions in which Matt
alone is responsible for the sexual aggression into ones
where Matt and Marg are co-agents.
Criminal Prosecutor: Do you remember her saying to
you that she was tired and wanted to go to sleep?
Matt: Yes.
Criminal Prosecutor: And you didn't let her-well, you
proceeded to touch her anyway,
isn't that correct?
7'
kissing.
started
we
Matt: No,
Obscuring: Matt uses agentless passives to obscure his
role in the initiation of sexual events. He provides no
overt information as to the cause of these acts.
Matt:

Well, as we were talking our pants were

72

undone.

Elimination: Matt turns grammatical subjects into
nominalizations, making the events appear to have no
particular cause or agent. The agents of the actions
below are "sexual activity" and "something sexual,"
with no reference to Matt's participation.
Defense Attorney: All right. What happens next,
please?
Matt: The sexual activity started escalating even
further.

70. Id. at 44.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id. at 47.
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Matt: Well, he knew that something sexual was going
on in my bed-well, in Mar§'s bed. He knew there was
something sexual going on.
Utilizing these four techniques, Matt's portrays his acts of sexual
aggression as having a force of their own-they are not under his
control.74
C. Questions and ideologicalwork
Ehrlich continues her "critical discourse analysis" in the
following chapter, focusing on the role of attorneys in re-circulating
discriminatory views of violence against women.75 The author argues
that defense attorneys ask questions that frame and structure the
complainants 'talk' about the sexual assault experience. Using this
technique, the lawyers are able to "produce the complainants as
particular kinds of subjects-as subjects who are 'passive' in their
76
responses to sexual aggression, as opposed to strategic and active."
Ehrlich argues that many still view rape trials through the
ideological frame of the 'utmost resistance standard', the standard of
proof required of complainants in the 1950s and 1960s.77 Ehrlich
adopts Fairclough's conclusion that "a defining characteristic of an
institutionally-dominant ideological frame is its capacity to be
naturalized-to be accepted as commonsensical," a characteristic that
makes the ideological frame more insidious. 78 The author asserts that
framing functions to characterize the woman as not resisting to the
utmost and ultimately reconstructs events as consensual sex. 79 Using
73. Id. at 50.
74. Id.at 52.

75. Id.at 63.
76. Id. Ehrlich uses the 1992 Rodney King criminal trial as an example of the role
linguistic practices can play in 'framing' events. The expert witnesses reconstructed the
beating by four policemen into a situation where King was "in control of the interaction." The
linguistic choices of the experts tended to shape the policemen's actions as responsible police
behavior. Id. at 64 (citing C. Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 606

(1994); C. Goodwin & M. Goodwin, Contested Vision: The Discursive Constitution of Rodney
King, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL DISCOURSE 292 (Britt-Louise Gunnarsson et al.

eds., 1997)).
77. Id. at 67. If a woman did not resist a man's sexual advances to the utmost, then rape
did not occur. Such strict requirements were established to safeguard men against fictitious
claims, since society believed women to fabricate most accusations of rape. Id. at 65. See
also supra text accompanying note 1.
78. Id. at 65 (citing NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: THE
CRITICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGE 27 (Longman 1995)).

79. Id. at 67.
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the questions asked of complainants by members of the university
tribunal, Ehrlich demonstrates how the ideological frame of the
'utmost resistance standard' pervades the discourse of today's neutral
0
decision-makers. 8
Tribunal members repeatedly asked complainants questions
regarding why they did not exercise other 'options' such as yelling out
or banging on the wall, to call for help.8 ' In the following example, a
tribunal member undermines Connie's claim that she was in trouble,
by pointing out that her actions did not conform to the "natural
actions" of one in danger:
Tribunal Member: Why is it that you made no attempt
to scream? Can you explain what you mean by 'I really
didn't want anybody to know?' If you were in such
difficulty, if you felt threatened, if you felt that an
assault was taking place, it strikes me as only naturalto
cry out and that help probably was available as that
wall was extremely thin.... 82
The tribunal member imposes his expectation that Connie's actions
should have conformed to the 'utmost resistance standard'-that is,
she should have used every possible method of stopping her assailant.
This discussion about 'options', Ehrlich argues, "fails to acknowledge
the power dynamics that can shape and restrict
women's behaviour in
83
the context of potential sexual violence."
D. Complainants' ineffectual agency or strategy agency?
Ehrlich expands upon the 'utmost resistance' ideological frame
and the role it played in Matt's sexual assault trials.
The
complainants' version of events are constrained not only by the
questions asked, but also by stereotypical notions of femininity that
shape the complainants' own representations of themselves. 8 By
emphasizing the victims' failure to act in their own behalf, the defense
attorney portrayed them as "ineffective agents," unable to act in ways
80. Id. at 76-78.
81.

Id. at 77-78.

82. Id. at 79.
83. Id. at 78. Ehrlich refers to the socialist feminist argument that pointing out 'options'
that victims could have explored "denies the socially-structured inequalities among individuals
that shape and restrict so-called options." Id.
84. Id. at 95.
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that effectively expressed their resistance to Matt's sexual
aggression. 85 In making their determinations of guilt, the university
tribunal considered the complainants' assessment of their own
actions. 8 Their opinion stated: "Both complainants conceded in their
testimony that they did not take the most sensible and available steps
to prevent the sexual touching from continuing. They both a reed that
in hindsight their actions were irrational and ineffective.""8 Ehrlich
criticizes the tribunal's use of the complainant's testimony. She
argues, "their identities [were] shaped and constrained by the
innumerable questions that presupposed the inadequacy of their
response to Matt's sexual aggression, [yet] here the complainants are
criticized for precisely these self-representations. 88
Additionally, the author claims that the complainants exhibited
signs of resistance to the gendered identities they were forced to
reproduce. 89 In the following example, Ehrlich argues that Connie
resists the questioner's characterization of her efforts as weak and
limited:
Defense Attorney: So do I take it then-correct me if I
am wrong-that the only effort that you would have
made to try and jolly him out of this or have him leave
was to say that, 'I have a class in the morning so you'll
have to leave,' or words to that effect?
Connie: No. That was not the only effort I made with
regards to making him stop doing what he was doing.
It may have been the only time that I outright said,
'Now you have to leave', but I certainly did make it
clear beforehand. 90
Marg was, able, at one point, to break free of her role of responder,
asking a question of the defense attorney and recharacterizing the
events in question from her perspective. Note, however, the attorney

85. Id. at 97.
86. Id. at 117.
87.

Id.

88. Id. Ehrlich challenges the justness of a process that is "framed almost exclusively
by a culturally-dominant ideological perspective that presupposed the complainant's behavior
to be lacking in appropriate resistance-this lack of resistance being equivalent to consent."
Id. at 119.
89. Id. at 97.
90. Id. at 107.
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abruptly shifts topics once Marg has effectively
challenged his
91
suggestion that she gave a mixed message to Matt.
Tribunal Member: You never asked Mr. A. to leave?
Marg: No.
Tribunal Member: I am suggesting that's another
mixed message. You said that you wanted to ignore
this?
Marg: Can I comment on that?
Tribunal Member: Sure. If I am suggesting something
to you I think you are entitled to do that.
Marg: If you are suggesting by my telling Matt not to
leave was a mixed message, 'I just want to go to sleep,'
not responding to him and saying, 'No I don't want to
do anything,' and 'Good night everybody,' is a pretty
loud message to me and I am sure it would be to any
person that chose to listen to it.
Tribunal Member: Did you say yesterday that
you
92
wore his shirt in the course of all this going on?
Immediately after Marg disputes the tribunal member's portrayal of
the events as consensual, the tribunal member refers to an act by Marg
that may have indicated consent by wearing the defendant's clothes.
Direct examination, then, becomes the vehicle by which
complainants can utilize their own voice in retelling the events from
their perspective. 93 Ehrlich argues, however, that even in direct
examination, the attorneys for the prosecution are "controlled in their
ability to radically redefine the defence lawyers' and tribunal
members' representation of events. 94 She again relies upon the
ideological framework of the 'utmost resistance standard' as the
underlying cause behind this control.95
As evidence of this
phenomenon, Ehrlich cites examples from the transcript where the
Crown attorney asks the complainant a question on redirect that
contains quotes from a defense attorney question. 96 The Crown
91. Id. at 108. Ehrlich quotes A.G. Walker's comment that in legal settings, "it is in the
hands of the questioner that the real power lies." Id. at 108 (citing A.G. Walker, Linguistic
Manipulation, Power and the Legal Setting, in POWER THROUGH DISCOURSE 79 (Leah Kedar
ed., 1987)).
92. Id. at 107-08.
93. Id. at 109.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 110.

96. See id.
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attorney uses this tactic to get a strong denial from the witness, thereby
undermining any weak response by the witness on crossexamination.97 Ehrlich argues that this type of questioning reveals the
limited capacity of the Crown attorney to "recontextualize, or reframe,
the 'meaning' of the events within an alternative interpretive
framework" (i.e., not the 'utmost resistance standard'). 98
E. Miscommunication and acquaintancerape
The author concludes her linguistic study with a commentary
on the new cultural explanation for acquaintance rape, labeled
male/female miscommunication. 99
Though some proclaim the
miscommunication account of rape "as a progressive alternative to the
00
victim precipitation model with its associated victim-blaming,"'
Ehrlich contends that the process does not eliminate victim blame, but
rather, incorporates traditional mythologies surrounding sexual
violence. 1 1
The author notes that while studies show that
complainants were not held accountable for rape on the basis of
provocative dress or promiscuous sexual past, they were 02held
accountable for not clearly communicating their lack of consent.'
Furthermore, advocates of the miscommunication model herald
it as legitimizing both male and female conversational styles, a
description Ehrlich recharacterizes as "separate, but equal."' 1 3 The
97. Id.
98. Id. at 109-10. Ehrlich argues that an additional reason for the Crown attorney's
inability to reframe the events is their own ideological perspective. As representatives of the
state, and not the complainants, they are themselves constrained by the values of the state,
which often do not serve the interests of women. Id. at 111.
99. Id. at 121. The miscommunication account of rape is based primarily on the "dualcultures" theory of communication between women and men. Advocates of this model of
communication suggest that miscommunication results from segregated play during
childhood, which causes an "inadequate or incomplete knowledge of the other group's
communicative norms." Id. at 122 (citing DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND:
WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION 47 (Morrow 1990)).
100. Id. (citing MARY CRAWFORD, TALKING DIFFERENCE: ON GENDER AND LANGUAGE
123 (Sage 1995)). Ehrlich acknowledges that, though the miscommunication model has
become the dominant method of explaining acquaintance rape, Crawford explicitly stated that
she does not apply her version of the model to "serious instances of gender struggle" such as
"rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment or sexual abuse." Id. at 122.
101. Id.
102. Ehrlich claims that the miscommunication model is simply a well-disguised version
of the 'utmost resistance standard.' In applying it to the trials examined in her study, she

states: "Because the complainants' signals of non-consent did not take particular forms, their
resistance to Matt's sexual aggression was deemed as weak and equivocal-such equivocation
being tantamount to success. Id.
103. Id. at 122.
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author argues that miscommunication-model supporters "ignore[ ] the
power or dominance relations within which men's and women's
conversational styles are developed-power relations that help to
shape the particular forms that these styles take."' 0 4 Applying her
critique of the miscommunication model to Matt's sexual assault trial,
the author argues that that model holds women responsible for failing
to signal their lack of consent in a certain (traditionally masculine)
manner, thereby deflecting men's responsibility for rape. 05 Ehrlich
claims that "separate but equal" models of communication work to
conceal "androcentric assumptions that legitimize the defendant's
defence of weak and equivocal 'signals' on the part of the
complainant."' 6 Ehrlich further alleges that Matt actively exploits this
weakness in the miscommunication model in order to rationalize his
interpretation of the events.' 0 7 "It is not that Matt mistakenly believes
that women's expression of non-consent are variable and not
definitive; rather he strategically relies on dominant notions of
male sexuality . . .in interpreting Marg's
masculinity .. .and' 10of
8
resistance."
of
signals
In this final chapter, Ehrlich introduces Ellison v. Brady,10 9 a
Ninth Circuit decision in which the court introduced a "reasonable
woman" standard for evaluating charges of sexual harassment, in lieu
of the traditional "reasonable person" standard. 1° The court justified
the new standard by explaining that they "believe that a sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women.""' According to
Ehrlich, there exists "a consensus among feminist legal scholars and
critical legal scholars alike that a shift from universal standards to
contextual or subjective standards exposes the masculine bias

104. Id.
105. Id. at 133.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 128.
108. Id. The dominant notion of masculinity is, in Ehrlich's opinion, that resistance is
expressed strongly and forcefully. Id.
109. 924 F.2d 872 (1991).
110. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 139.
111. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881. In this court's estimation, the reasonable person standard
ignored that women were disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, which fact
gives women a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. "Men, who are rarely
victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of
the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive." Id. at 87881.
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embedded in the 'reasonable person."' 12 If the tribunal and criminal
court hearing Matt's sexual assault trials applied the reasonable
woman standard,. a very different outcome may have resulted." 3 The
complainants often explained that the main reason for their inaction
was fear of being hurt-an explanation that did not satisfy the tribunal
members or the judge."14 If viewed through a 'reasonable woman'
ideological frame, however, the complainants' inaction "can be
recontextualized 115
as strategic acts of resistance, and not indicators of
consensual sex."
Ehrlich ends her case study with a brief summary of the points
made throughout her book. She, reiterates her main argument that the
hearings did not allow the complainants' version of events to
emerge." 6 The author maintains that the outcomes of the hearings
may have been influenced by the subject positions that were
"discursively 'thrust upon' the complainants.""
In conclusion, she
asserts that by recognizing language's capacity to structure
objects,
8
one can also recognize the rape trial's capacity for change."

112. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 139. Ehrlich herself supports the "reasonable woman"
standard because it recognizes that "socially-structured differences among individuals
influence the sort of background knowledge that interlocutors bring to bear upon the
interpretation of sexual acts of communication." Id. at 140.
113. Id. at 140-42.
114. Id. at 142-43.
115. Id. at 144. One example from the trials that the decision-makers emphasized is that
Marg promised to sleep with Matt later that weekend, if he let her go to sleep. She claimed
that this was to placate him in the hope that he would leave her alone for the rest of the night,
allowing her to deal with the promise in a more effective way such as staying with friends,
leaving town, etc. Id. at 113.
Ehrlich cites this example to demonstrate how the
complainants' alleged "inactions" could be characterized as choices that prevented more
serious and prolonged instances of violence. Id. at 145.
116. Id.-at152.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS

Ehrlich's linguistic study of the hegemonic notions of
masculinity that permeate the legal arena is a well-documented,
thought-provoking analysis of aspects of sexual assault trials that are
rarely discussed. While she briefly cites the numerous studies
exposing the rape trial as a revictimization of the complainant, forcing
them to retell (and relive) the story of their attack, she moves beyond
this commonly criticized characteristic of sexual assault
adjudication. 1 9 Ehrlich's case study explores the more subtle
influences that male-dominated cultural ideologies may have on
adjudication processes and exposes the difficulties in eradicating their
presence from decision-making. In this analysis, I will analyze the
author's placement of contradictory material within the text,
overstatement in parts of the book, and lack of guidance for future
improvement of the conditions she criticizes. After examining these
criticisms of Ehrlich's book, I will then turn to well-earned praise.
A. Ehrlich Fails to Adequately Discuss Opposing Theories
On one occasion, Ehrlich fails to cite contradictory material in
the body of her book, placing it instead in an endnote. The author cites
a 1994 La France and Hahn study, which found that subjects tended to
attribute greater causality to patients, as opposed to agents, when
interpreting sentences represented in the passive voice. 120 Ehrlich does
not indicate that there is any reason to doubt the validity of this study
as applied to sexual assault cases. Located 100 pages after Ehrlich
mentions the study, the endnote gives the following information:
"When men were the agents of sentences, subjects attributed greater
responsibility to them as opposed to patients of the sentences, whether
or not the events were represented in passive or active voice."' 2 This
revelation tends to discredit Ehrlich's argument that male defendants
employ the passive voice to avoid accountability for their sexually
119. See id. at 1 (citing SUE LEES, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE: RAPE ON TRIAL 36 (Hamish
Hamilton 1996); G. Matoesian, Language, Law, and Society: Policy Implications of the
Kennedy Smith Rape Trial, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 669, 676 (1995); CAROL SMART,
FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 161 (Routledge 1989)).
120. Id. at 40 (citing M. LaFrance and G. Hahn, The DisappearingAgent: Gender
Stereotypes, Interpersonal Verbs and Implicit Causality, in THE WOMEN AND LANGUAGE
DEBATE: A SOURCEBOOK 348 (Camille A. Roman et al. eds., 1994)). See also supra text
accompanying notes 56-58.
121. Id. at 154.
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aggressive acts. If greater responsibility is attributed to males than to
their victims, regardless of whether the male uses passive voice, this
to sexual assault trials, where perpetrators
study has far less relevance
22
are usually males.1
A second instance of questionable placement of conflicting
information occurs in Ehrlich's discussion of the new 'reasonable
woman' standard, which has been introduced in some courts to replace
23
the 'reasonable person' standard in sexual assault adjudication.
Ehrlich does not reveal the existence of this movement away from
male-biased standards in the appropriate chapter that discusses
hegemonic masculinity as it is enforced in judicial decisions. Rather,
she places it on the tenth to last page in the book, where it is applauded
as a great advance for women and then forgotten. 124 Ehrlich's
strategic placement of the new standard serves to limit the potentially
adverse effect it could have on her earlier statements regarding the
inequality of rape trials. 125 Additionally, Ehrlich allots this novel
approach, which reveals a possible method for reframing sexual
assault discourse, only one page, whereas criticism of the judiciary's
reliance on cultural mythology surrounding rape adjudication
monopolizes much of the text. 126
The author's tendency to obscure relevant but contrary facts
causes the reader to doubt the credibility of the author's assertions.
Ehrlich advances sound, persuasive arguments and supporting
evidence, even in the face of contrary theories and studies. By hiding
conflicting information, Ehrlich leads the reader to believe that the
concealed evidence is far more damaging to her contentions than it
actually is. The author should acknowledge this opposing evidence
and discuss the impact that it may have on her theories, even if it may
serve to weaken her conclusions.

122. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 91% of victims of rape and sexual
assault are female and 9% are male. Nearly 99% of the offenders they described in singlevictim incidents are male. Families in Crisis, Inc., Sexual Assault Statistics, at
http://www.familiesincrisis.net/sexualassaultstatistics.html (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Violence Against Women (1994)).
123. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 139. See also supra, text accompanying notes 97-100.
124. Id.
125. I am not suggesting that this new standard in any way would compensate for all
inequalities women face in rape adjudication, or that Ehrlich's allegations regarding that
inequality would be defeated by the existence of this standard. I do believe, however, that
Ehrlich should have included the "reasonable woman" standard as part of her scrutiny of
judicial decision-making where it would have made more sense contextually.
126. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 139.
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B. EhrlichFrequentlyFails to Offer
Sufficient Supportfor Her Conclusions
While Ehrlich appropriately documents the majority of her
thesis statements, a few were clearly overstated. While exaggeration
may emphasize the importance of the underlying claim, its use caused
the reader to doubt the validity of the author's assertions. The first
noticeable example was during the author's discussion of "legitimate
perpetrators" and "legitimate victims," wherein she claimed that
women only reported rapes that they considered believable.' 27 In
support of her contention, Ehrlich cites a 1978 survey of
approximately 1,000 women. 128 Her second choice of statistical
support comes from Estrich, who "draws the generalization that
women are less likely to report rape 'the closer the relationship
between victim and assailant' on the basis of "a number of other
studies investigating rape reporting rates."' 129 These "other studies"
remain unidentified. Ehrlich published her book in 2001, yet the
statistical data she cites is from 1978 and 1987.13° The long time span
between the statistical data and the present leads the reader to question
whether those statistics were chosen not because they were the most
accurate, but because they were the most supportive of her claims.
Ehrlich then quotes MacKinnon's speculation that "the rapes
that have been reported ... are the kinds of rape women think will be
believed when we report them."' 131 MacKinnon similarly published
her book in 1987.132 According to the National Crime Victimization
Survey, conducted by the United States Department of Justice, only
31% of rape victims in 1996 reported the incident to law enforcement
officials. 13 However, the victim purportedly knew the perpetrator in
75% of all lone-offender violence and 45% of violence involving
multiple offenders.' 34 Rape statistics are based on reporting rates,
127. See supra, text accompanying notes 42-44.
128. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 139 (citing DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE
(Macmillan 1982); DIANA RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE,
AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT (Sage 1984)).
129. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 20 (citing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (Harvard
University Press 1987)).

130.

Id.

131. Id. at 21 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 81 (Harvard
University Press 1987)).
132. See supra, note 117.
133. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ-154348, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY (August 1995), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gove/bjs/pub/pdf/femvied.pdf.
134. Id.
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which undoubtedly are influenced by the victim's perception of the
believability of her claim. Nevertheless, statistics that report 75% of
lone-offender violence as committed by an acquaintance of the victim
contradict Ehrlich's claim that women rarely report acquaintance-rape.
Indeed, the two cases that Ehrlich discusses in this book were
acquaintance rape cases, yet the victims reported the events to both the
university and to criminal justice officials. 35
A second instance of overstatement comes in the chapter that
discusses the 'utmost resistance standard' and its impact on the
ideological frame through which both participants and outsiders view
sexual assault trials. The author provides several examples of how the
tribunal members and criminal judge indicated that Marg's actions did
not meet the utmost resistance standard.' 36 She did so in an attempt to
show that they are still influenced by that standard despite its removal
from sexual assault adjudication. 137 Ehrlich later states that "without
the utmost resistance on the part of the complainants ... rape did not
occur." 38 While Ehrlich fully explains the concept of the 'utmost
resistance' ideological frame, and applies it to Matt's sexual assault
trial, she never explains how Matt was convicted of the claim brought
by Marg, given that Marg did not resist to the utmost.
In the final instance of overstatement Ehrlich argues that the
attorneys for the prosecution are "controlled in their ability to radically
redefine the defence lawyers' and tribunal members' representation of
events." 139 She states that the Crown attorneys are unable to avoid
using the language and the characterizations used by the
prosecution. 40 However, because the Crown has the burden of proof,
it presents its case before the defense presents its witnesses.
Therefore, it is only on redirect that the prosecution can use quotes
from the defenses' cross-examination in addressing their witnesses.
Indeed, Ehrlich uses re-direct questions asked by the Crown as
illustrative examples. 14 1 Ehrlich fails to mention that the prosecution
can conduct direct examination of all of their witnesses without the
influence of the defense's previous characterizations.

EHRLICH, supranote 1, at 31-32.
136. Id. at 76-79.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 92.
139. Id. at 109. See also supra, text accompanying notes 83-86.
140. Id. at 110.
141. Id.
135.
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C. Ehrlich Omits Presentationof PotentialSolutions
My final criticism of Ehrlich's work is the lack of suggestions
regarding how sexual assault adjudication can be freed from the
constraints of hegemonic masculinity. Her closing chapter reads as
follows:
To locate the problem of rape trials in discursive
practices, embodied in institutional settings, is ... to
recognize the structuring potential of language, its
capacity to constitute the objects of which it speaks and
the effects of this structuring on the particular way rules
are enacted and sanctions are imposed.
•. [T]o understand rape trials 42
in this way is to
1
change.
for
capacity
their
recognize
Though the reader can "recognize the capacity for change," Ehrlich
fails to communicate to the reader the true potential for change. She
does not contribute information regarding positive changes thus far, or
possible avenues that should be explored in the future.
The
replacement of the 'reasonable person' standard with the 'reasonable
woman' standard is the only encouraging system modification
discussed in the text. 143 Additionally, although she applauds the new
standard as a great advance for women in sexual assault adjudication,
Ehrlich fails to expand upon the idea. She does not advocate for other
standards to be altered to reflect a more woman-friendly perspective.
She also declines to address the possibility that, by using altered
standards, the judiciary and attorneys will have a heightened
awareness of the female point-of-view, causing them to question malebiased approaches to sexual assault adjudication. The noticeable
absence of such comments leads the reader to the assumption that
Ehrlich does not have much hope for changes in rape trials in the
future, despite her claim that her book "recognize[s] their capacity for
change."

142.
143.
144.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 139. See also supra, notes 97-100.
Id. at 152.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Susan Ehrlich's Representing Rape: language and sexual consent
achieves its objective by making the reader aware of the allencompassing influence of hegemonic masculinity upon sexual assault
adjudication. Her case study provides insight into the subtle methods
of manipulation, such as the accused's grammar of non-agency and the
'utmost resistance' standard ideological frame, that often go unnoticed.
However, the strength of the author's conclusions were weakened by
her tendency to overlook contradictory studies, lack of support for
some of her conclusions, and failure to offer the reader promising
solutions to the problem of male-dominated sexual assault trials.
Nevertheless, given the increased emphasis on restructuring statutes
that protect the victims of sexual assault crimes in the last decade,
Ehrlich's linguistic study provides a timely and significant approach to
eliminating cultural myths surrounding sexual assault.
By
acknowledging these subtle techniques and stereotypes, the author
makes the reader aware of their overarching control of the adjudication
process. Acknowledging the presence of culturally-dominant notions
about rape and the manner in which they influence the outcomes of
sexual assault trials is the first step towards meaningful progress for
victims of sex crimes.

